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Social Criticism, Moral Reasoning and the 
Literary Form 
Abstract  
Widely chosen by students of society as an approach under which to 
labour, emancipatory, liberatory or, otherwise put, critical social thought 
occupies a position between knowledge and practical action whose 
coherence is typically taken for granted on account of the pressing 
nature of the issues it attempts to deal with. As such it is rarely subjected 
to scrutiny and the methodological, conceptual and moral challenges it 
faces are not properly identified. The contribution of this article is to 
raise these problems into view clearly and unambiguously. This is 
undertaken via a careful examination of Alice Crary’s recent work, in 
which she attempts, firstly, to defend a left-Hegelian version of Critical 
Theory by relating it to the work of Peter Winch and, secondly, to issue 
a set of methodologically radical recommendations on employing the 
sensibility-shaping powers of the literary form. The article aims to 
deepen our understanding of the fundamental tensions between the 
Critical Theory and Wittgensteinian traditions, which Crary attempts to 
bring together and, ultimately, of those crucial features of our moral 
practices that frustrate the enterprise of critical social thought.  
 
1. Introduction 
While social criticism in the wide sense can be said to be exercised 
diffusely across society, the social sciences have long aspired to have 
a professional version enshrined within their activities. 
Methodological orientations variously dubbed as emancipatory, 
liberatory or critical, which are conceived as explicitly discharging 
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such a function, are widely adopted by students of society. 
Disciplinarily organised forms of social criticism, strands of critical 
social thought such as Critical Theory (Horkheimer 1982; Adorno et 
al. 1976; Habermas 1978; Honneth 2009),1 claim methodological and 
theoretical advantages that distinguish them from moralising talk, 
rants, the airing of personal grievances, campaigning or propaganda 
and tie them to certain cognitive claims that are thought to be pivotal 
in the moral enlightenment and emancipation of those they seek to 
engage. The morally charged nature of the issues critical social 
thought claims to deal with accounts for its significant popularity 
within the social sciences and humanities, but also for the fact that 
its methodological, conceptual and moral coherence is seldom given 
due attention. This is surprising because even by the admission of 
Axel Honneth, one of the chief contemporary exponents of Critical 
Theory, it has not been satisfactorily developed or defended to a high 
standard (2009: Chapters 2 and 3). 
 In this article, I examine a recent elaboration of Critical Theory 
by Alice Crary (2018b) who defends a left-Hegelian version and 
attempts to bolster its metaphysical credentials by relating it to the 
work of Peter Winch. Crary also complements that defence with a 
set of methodological recommendations (2016; 2018a) regarding the 
power of “non-neutral resources”, such as the literary form, 
proposing that they be employed in methodologically radical 
projects. Considered as one, Crary’s recent work presents an 
intriguing overall attempt to further the aims of critical social 
thought and to reinforce its authoritativeness by showing that, what 
she calls, “wide” notions of objectivity, rationality and argument 
apply to it, particularly in the face of an audience of analytic 
philosophers who would prefer to withhold these expressions from 
such forms of inquiry. Crary also claims as an achievement the fact 
that she combines the left-Hegelian and Wittgensteinian traditions.  
In what follows, I will subject all of the above to detailed scrutiny, 
beginning in Section 2 by examining Crary’s defence of Critical 
Theory and invocation of Peter Winch. Section 3 assesses the 
                                                          
1  In this article I will use the following terms somewhat interchangeably although I 
acknowledge that they are only partly overlapping and, for instance, can be seen to relate to 
each other in a descending order of generality: ‘Social criticism’, ‘Critical social thought’, 
‘Critical social science’ and ‘Critical Theory’ (cf. Fay 1987: 4-5). 
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methodological import of Crary’s discussion of the sensibility-
shaping powers of the literary form. In Section 4 I return to Winch’s 
work in order to provide a clarification of some features of our moral 
practices that militate against the fascination with form and, further, 
pose problems for critical social thought. 
 
2. Critical Theory and Its Metaphysical Credentials 
In her article “Wittgenstein Goes to Frankfurt (and Finds Something 
Useful to Say)”, recently published in this journal, Crary attempts a 
complex balancing act of coordinating thinkers that span the analytic 
and continental traditions in the name of “advancing […] the 
enterprise of liberating social thought” (2018b: 7). Her point of 
departure is the assessment that (philosophical understanding and 
underpinning of) the enterprise suffers from an overly narrow 
conception of rationality which can be profitably extended with 
materials gathered from the left-Hegelian and Wittgensteinian 
traditions. Regarding the latter, Crary particularly points to Peter 
Winch’s work (1990), which she takes as recommending an ontology 
of the social world as constitutively ethical and, thus, rejecting deeply 
engrained conceptions that equate ‘the rational’ with what is backed 
by universal norms and ‘the world’ or ‘reality’ with what remains 
after morality and values have been subtracted. Once the left-
Hegelian tradition is inflected by this ontology, the result is a “widely 
rational critique”, which can include (new) moral perspectives and 
all kinds of cultural, ethical and historical values as well as display 
contextual sensitivity without thereby relinquishing its claims to 
being rationally authoritative, world-directed or objective, in short, 
to portraying things “as they really are” (2018b: 11).  
The payoff of Crary’s operations is mostly illustrated via 
reference to legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw, whose work (1991; 
1992), although perhaps not within Critical Theory as such, has 
emancipatory aims and has shed light on the forms of harm 
experienced by black women by invoking historical, structural and 
institutional features of U.S. society. Given Crary’s adjustments, 
Crenshaw’s work can be dubbed “genuinely rational” and morally 
charged descriptions can be legitimately offered, such as, for 
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example, in claiming without any reservation, in an infamous case of 
a white police officer, Daniel Holtzclaw, sexually assaulting black 
women, that his selection of victims is vile without having to add 
that it is so only given how things appear in our social context 
(2018b: 19–20). 
Casting a closer look at Crary’s argument, its first part is 
concerned with responding to the various charges (including 
paternalism, elitism, ethnocentrism and mere partisanship) that beset 
different versions of Critical Theory. According to Crary, versions 
of Kantian inspiration, such as the one propounded by Habermas, 
struggle to defend the truth of moral beliefs against a world bereft 
of value, a problem they attempt to solve not by changing their 
conception of the world but by denying that moral beliefs can be 
descriptively true and opting instead for “practical universalisability”. 
Yet, the stipulation of a formal method well in advance leaves them 
vulnerable to charges of ethnocentrism and, thus, leads to the 
eventual frustration of emancipatory goals. Poststructuralist versions 
of Critical Theory are also found wanting because they do not 
challenge the assumption that “neutrality is necessary for true 
universality” but proceed to deny the possibility of neutrality and 
universality, thus being limited to various “positive liberating 
exercises” and obliged to add various qualifications to their claims in 
order to defeat any strong sense of “rationality” or “objective 
progress”. Crary is dissatisfied with holding back from making 
strong claims to rationality and progress and considers the 
poststructuralist position as trading on a misconception, namely, that 
the impossibility of adopting a dispassionate standpoint is an idea 
sufficiently well-formed to imply such limitations on our claims. 
Instead, the left-Hegelian Critical Theory she opts to defend, having 
developed immunity to charges of elitism, ethnocentrism and mere 
partisanship, considers the notion of a dispassionate standpoint as 
incoherent and thus cancels the inference from its denial to the 
denial of universal authority. This type of Critical Theory can 
unapologetically pronounce moral beliefs as true, moral arguments 
as rationally authoritative and progress as just that, and it can do so 
precisely because it employs what Crary understands to be a “wide” 
notion of rationality. The problem for Crary, however, is that those 
Nordic Wittgenstein Review 7 (2) 2018 | pp. 77-109 | DOI 10.15845/nwr.v7i2.3512 
81 
 
who are in the grip of a certain picture of reality and the relationship 
between mind and world, that is, mostly analytic philosophers, find 
this notion difficult to accept. 
Then Peter Winch appears to provide an alternative picture. 
Particularly with reference to The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation 
to Philosophy, he is taken to argue that the generality involved in 
concept use is dependent on context-sensitivity, a “feel” for 
similarities and dissimilarities of context and, thus, on kinds of 
sensibilities and inclinations that encode values or are shaped by 
normativity. The import of Winch’s arguments for Crary is that 
understanding, using and extending such concepts is an “ethically 
charged” matter and that what shapes our sensibilities in a way 
necessary for handling concepts may be seen as belonging to the 
objective world and not as being merely subjective.  
This concludes my exposition of Crary’s argument. Most 
charitably, it can be seen as trying to break free from the constricted 
grasp of a rigid notion of rationality and move beyond the options 
of contextualism and universalism or the entailed exclusive 
disjunction between universal rational authoritativeness and 
contextual sensitivity. Moreover, Crary is trying to warn against what 
she calls an attitude of “obligatory abstraction” of any ethical 
features and our “subjective endowments” (2018b: 33) from the 
notion of world. On the other hand, Crary’s use of ‘world’, 
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ already serves as an indication that not all 
is well with her invocation of Winch (and Wittgenstein). In fact, 
there are significant problems, which I would like to examine in the 
remainder of this section. I will contend that Crary’s project imposes 
metaphysical theses on Winch and Wittgenstein (2.1), falsifies the 
nature of moral reasoning by tying it to metaphysical credentials (2.2) 
and bypasses the real methodological problems with Critical Theory 
(2.3). 
2.1 Wittgenstein’s Conversion on the Road to Frankfurt 
It seems that the Wittgenstein that Crary has taken to Frankfurt had 
a revelation along the way and, like Saul on the road to Damascus, 
from persecutor became a disciple of metaphysics, taking for granted 
the well-formedness of metaphysical questions on objective reality 
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and subscribing to the attending rigid vocabulary that is indispensible 
in their posing (Stenlund 1996). Crary not only takes Winch and 
Wittgenstein as postulators of an alternative ontology, rather than as 
withdrawing their own stakes when it comes to what philosophers 
understand as ontology (Tsilipakos 2015) but she also throws in her 
lot in handling expressions such as ‘objective’, ‘how things really are’, 
‘the world’, ‘reality’ and ‘rationality’, not by embedding them in the 
stream of practical life and seeing what they actually amount to, but 
rather by referring them to philosophical pictures, such as that of 
world and mind, or the offered alternative, improved but no less 
metaphysical, which conceives reality as constitutively ethical.  
Crary takes it that “Winch […] is giving us an image of a region 
of objective reality as intrinsically an ethical realm […] placing 
himself in opposition to the sort of engrained conception of reality 
on which it is in itself bereft of ethical value” (2018b: 31). But it 
should be remembered that it is no part of Winch or Wittgenstein’s 
project to produce any kind of composite picture of objective reality. 
If anything, both would point out that the very expressions 
‘objective’ and ‘reality’ obtain different senses across various 
domains of life and activity. This, for example, is the import of 
remarks such as “The point is that it is within the religious use of 
language that the conception of God’s reality has its place” and 
“What is real and what is unreal shows itself in the sense that 
language has” (Winch 1964: 309) as well as reminders on the notion 
of rationality directed against Pareto’s implicit judgement of religious 
and other activities as irrational via the imposition of scientific 
logico-experimental criteria (Winch 1990: Chapter 4), which is 
precisely why no metaphysically singular sense can be obtained of 
the expression ‘objective reality’. Moreover, it is worth remembering 
that ‘the world’ as in ‘the mind and the world’ and ‘the world’ as in 
‘the social world’ are hardly similar in sense: the former is 
philosophically understood as a mind-independent reality and thus 
as having in that sense an objective existence, whereas this 
understanding and the connotations of objectivity cannot be 
retained in speaking of ‘the social world’. The implication is that ‘the 
social world’ is not a part or region of ‘the world’ nor will it become 
one by pretending that ‘world’ is more capacious than it actually is. 
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Following Winch and Wittgenstein does not lead to a “wider notion 
of objectivity” (cf. Crary 2016: 211–2) but to giving up the 
metaphysical project and instead paying attention to the various ways 
in which the relevant expressions are used.  
Thus, Crary’s use is not only contrary to the Wittgensteinian 
spirit, which also animates Winch, but, as regards the latter’s work 
and her attempt to render it compatible with the concerns of Critical 
Theory, she ends up being somewhat selective, for – yet another – 
example in not taking into account Winch’s objections against Karl-
Otto Apel’s transcendental pragmatics and its presupposition of 
universal agreement (1979). The objections raised therein might 
seem to be directed at a version of Critical Theory Crary has rejected, 
but they arguably also apply to the version she favours. Finally, there 
is a large part of Winch’s later work in which he examines, as he puts 
it in Ethics and Action, “the way in which moral concepts may enter 
into a man’s understanding and assessment of his own life” (1972: 
2), which raises further problems for Critical Theory. I will come 
back to this in Section 4. 
2.2 Does Social Criticism Need Metaphysical Credentials? 
Crary’s noted rigid commitment to a basic philosophical vocabulary 
(‘rationality’, ‘objectivity’, ‘reality’, ‘the world’, etc.) is indicative of 
the idea that its retention is imperative if any credibility is to be 
attached to social criticism. In other words, her idea is the 
metaphysical credentialing of social criticism, which is thought 
incapable of standing on its own two feet unless supplemented by 
an ontology or a certain conception of rationality.2 
The idea seems to be that Crenshaw does not speak with enough 
of an authoritative voice unless such a voice can be dubbed genuinely 
rational under a “widely rational” conception; or that her work 
                                                          
2  The point is well put by Nigel Pleasants (1999: 182) who correctly perceives the 
incompatibility between Wittgensteinian work and Critical Theory in noting that: “The kind 
of philosophy practised by critical social theorists serves only to obscure the nature of real 
social and political problems by attempting to solve them through transcendental 
theoretical representation. This mode of explanation seems to suggest that problems cease 
to be problems when they are accurately represented in a theoretical system. Wittgensteinian 
deconstruction of pseudo-explanations is merely the prolegomenon to thinking about 
urgent social, political and ethical issues.” See also Hertzberg (2002). 
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would end up being pronounced as merely partisan and thus as 
devoid of rational authority, unless the kinds of features that she 
invokes are metaphysically grounded. As we saw, this securing is 
conceived with reference to Winch who, according to Crary, “as a 
rule represents social understanding […] as genuine – not merely 
subjective – understanding, it follows that he is asking us to regard 
such understanding as both irreducibly ethical and objective” 
(2018b: 31). But, surely, the use of such considerations to allay the 
charge of partisanship conflates an epistemological with a political 
charge. Partisanship as a problem for social criticism has to do with 
the latter and with the defence of particular values which are 
controversial when pitted against other kinds of values, whereas the 
epistemological sense is one of being “subjective” as opposed to 
“objective” or “world-guided”, as Crary puts it. Yet, as we will have 
reason to note in what follows, even if the world-guided character of 
Crenshaw’s work is granted this does nothing to defend the values 
against other equally world-guided kinds of values. 
Thus, one may wonder precisely what is gained for social 
criticism by playing into ontological pictures and insisting on the 
need for metaphysical credentials to secure the assertion that a critic 
describes things as they really are, or is genuinely rationally 
authoritative or objective. Not only is there no need to provide a 
licence for the use of expressions such as ‘objective’, ‘rational’, 
‘authoritative’, for example, in the realm of political discourse, where 
they can be used in appropriate senses in support of all kinds of 
programmes, together with which they stand or fall, but there is also 
no genuine support provided by these expressions in their 
metaphysical inflection. If that move is supposed to establish, by 
unreservedly speaking of the truth of critical claims, that there is a 
truth of the matter in the sense of there being no room for 
disagreement, or, by locating any debate as having to do with 
objective matters, that any such disagreement can be resolved, it runs 
in the face of social life where disagreements do exist and 
determinations as to rationality are never an all-or-nothing matter. 
Most importantly, Crary’s proposal does not raise the right questions 
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about what rationality3 or authoritativeness or reality4 amount to in 
these matters, since the attempt at metaphysical credentialing takes 
us away from appreciating the role of these expressions in practices 
of moral reasoning. 
2.3 The Real Problems with Critical Theory 
The issues we have encountered so far are not unrelated to the fact 
that Crary is defending the Critical Theory tradition; in fact, they 
derive in large part from the weight that tradition places on notions 
of (immanence to) social reality and rationality. It is worth noting, 
however, that while the former notion can receive a rather strong 
formulation – e.g., Honneth claims that “there must be in social 
reality itself normative ideas” (2009: 49) – which is retained in the 
kinds of concerns Crary raises, there is also an instructive 
interpretation of the importance of immanence and “immanent 
critique” as a methodological principle. Precisely as a measure of 
preventing the elitism that would follow from a stark separation of 
the critical theorist from participants, it can have to do with locating 
                                                          
3 Lars Hertzberg and David Cockburn first raised this type of concern in response to Crary’s 
presentation of an earlier version of her article at the conference “Truth, Politics and 
Metaphysics: Celebrating the Work of Peter Winch” at King’s College, London, in June 
2017. 
4 One way to appreciate the sense of ‘reality’ in moral understanding and to see the disjoint 
between that and its metaphysical use is to consider Raimond Gaita’s discussion of the 
formulaic distinction between appearance and reality in the context of what it is for moral 
understanding to deepen (2004: Chapter 15), a discussion which is tied to a wide vocabulary 
of critical appraisal and not the limited one of metaphysical pictures.  
Another case of looking at the use of ‘reality’ within a moral context, is given by Iris 
Murdoch who writes the following in connection with her classic example of M and D: “I 
can choose within the world I can see, in the moral sense of ‘see’ which implies that clear 
vision is a result of moral imagination and moral effort. There is also of course ‘distorted 
vision’, and the word ‘reality’ here inevitably appears as a normative word [which, she 
elaborates on p.64, means that it is better to know what is real than be in a state of illusion]. 
When M is just and loving she sees D as she really is” (1985 [1970]: 37).  
  But note that ‘reality’ here is sensitive to the specifics of interpersonal relationships. 
The force of seeing D as she really is has to do with removing what stands in the way, i.e. 
those obstacles of prejudice and particular vices that, in this case, obstruct M’s view, not to 
say that everyone will come to see that D is this, that and the other – as Murdoch herself 
notes: “That of which [freedom] is knowledge, that ‘reality’ which we are so naturally led to 
think of as revealed by ‘just attention’, can of course, given the variety of human personality 
and situation, only be thought of as ‘one’, as a single object for all men, in some very remote 
and ideal sense” (1985 [1970]: 38). 
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normative beliefs in particular groups of agents, as opposed to their 
introduction by the theorist. According to Honneth, starting from 
“experiences of injustice and misrecognition” (Boltanski et al. 2014: 
573) can be seen as a methodological solution to the danger of the 
imposition of the critical theorist’s own values. This contrast 
furnishes the expression ‘social reality’ with a very specific 
methodological sense.5  
Before expanding further on Critical Theory’s methodological 
concerns, I would like to turn to the concept of reason or rationality, 
which is seen as central in furnishing a context-transcending 
justification of norms. As Honneth notes, “the critical model of the 
Frankfurt School presupposes, if not precisely a philosophy of 
history, then a concept of the directed development of human 
rationality” (2009: 51) and proceeds to elaborate that this concept of 
“historically effective reason” descends from a left-Hegelian account 
of progress and social rationalisation capable of picking out those 
ideals that are the “embodiment of social reason”. This is necessary 
because there is thought to be a further problem of justification, 
which requires that “Critical Theory [use] a concept of reason that 
can justify the normative validity of the immanently raised ideals” 
(2009: 50).6 Yet it is implausible to claim that any satisfactory account 
of the development of human rationality has been, or, considered in 
light of Winch’s observations I quoted in 2.1, could actually be 
offered. In fact, the very idea that immanently described moral 
beliefs require this kind of justification is highly dubious because it 
                                                          
5 Immanence in the sense of “moral values which are capable of being understood by 
others” (Beardsmore 1969: 62) can be seen as a condition of relevance or even intelligibility, 
not only for the audience of critique but even for the moral rebel or revolutionary herself. 
6 Honneth’s summary formulation of the tasks for Critical Theory is as follows: “The 
constructive justification of a critical standpoint is to provide a conception of rationality 
that establishes a systematic connection between social rationality and moral validity. It is 
then to be reconstructively shown that this potential rationality determines social reality in 
the form of moral ideals. And these moral ideals, in turn, are to be seen under the 
genealogical proviso that their original meaning may have socially become unrecognizable.” 
(Honneth 2009: 53). See also Marcelo (2013: 216-8). 
An alternative or, depending on one’s conception, different version of this account 
of rationality can be found in Geuss’s explication of Habermas’s Critical Theory (1981: 55-
95) where justification of those ideals is thought to consist in their being deemed 
“reflectively acceptable” in so far as they have not been formed under conditions of 
coercion. I do not think that this account is any more satisfactory. For one it does not seem 
capable of addressing conflicts between ideals (cf. Winch 1979). 
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falsifies the fabric of moral life by finding it faulty, unless it can be 
premised on an account of the development of human rationality. 
Yet we already act and argue and have things to say and things to say 
about the things we do and say, “we” here including Critical 
Theorists, whose moral practices are arguably cut from the same 
cloth as everyone else’s. 
The metaphysically inflected debate that Crary draws both from 
analytic philosophy and the critical theoretical tradition is only 
incidental to the most difficult questions that Critical Theory (see 
Geuss 1981, Keat 1981, and Fay 1987), and more generally a critical 
social science (Fay 2015: Chapter 5), has to answer. As a stark 
example consider the characteristic claim that critical social science 
produces knowledge, albeit a very particular kind of knowledge, 
which is scientific in a certain sense, but also intended to guide 
practical action. It is far from clear what it means to claim such a 
status, which is why this conception generates the following 
irresolvable tensions: 
The figure of the critic claims to be in an epistemically 
asymmetric position to those for whom critique is being produced. 
But it remains unspecified whether such asymmetry is a) occasion or 
topic-dependent or, on the other hand, an invariant matter, b) 
systematic or irregular, c) irreversible or potentially reversible and, 
thus, ruling out monopoly of the function. 
Reversibility is in effect denied by embedding the exercise of 
critique within social science, a fact which not only institutionalises 
the asymmetry but also implies that the disciplinary background 
provides some kind of (uniquely) appropriate support and that those 
who rely on such support have a special claim to knowledge and 
expertise. Yet the paternalistic relationship between experts and lay 
people is actually declared undesirable by proponents on the grounds 
that it involves control over persons (cf. Lesnoff 1979) (whereas in 
cases of genuine expertise it would be difficult to completely rule out 
paternalism). Regardless of how one conceives the relationship to 
the lay person, there remains the burden of specifying exactly the 
corpus of knowledge and specialist methods which serve as a basis 
for the critic. The absence of such backing strains the application of 
the concepts of knowledge and expertise, and leaves one wondering 
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why social science is thought to be so particularly well-equipped to 
discharge a specialised critical function.  
The concept of knowledge is stretched towards the other 
direction in the conception that knowledge is being validated in the 
self-understanding of agents and that actors “help to determine the 
truth” (Fay 2015: 108). This seems to deny paternalism but, once 
again, the denial is contradictory because, firstly, the range of options 
allowed to the agent is limited by the theory and, secondly, the initial 
intervention by the critic is based on her perception of a lack of 
awareness by the agent, which, ultimately, need not be confirmed by 
the agent herself. Moreover, the fact that the determination of truth 
is treated as exchangeable with practical aims, typically described as 
the agent’s liberation, emancipation or enlightenment, suppresses 
the difference between the validation of truth and notions such as 
effectiveness, persuasion, propaganda, deceit or self-deception, 
conversion and also being sincere, deciding for oneself, attaining 
wisdom or moral understanding which, in truth, are much closer to 
the range of phenomena in question than are notions of knowledge 
or truth. 
In sum, the central problems with critical social science have to 
do with the tensions between its self-conception as a form of inquiry 
(see Hammersley 1995), its stated emancipatory aims, and its relation 
to practices of moral reasoning. Crary’s metaphysical credentialing 
approach leaves those problems intact, including the latter aspect 
which, having to do with a sound conception of what it is to reason 
about moral ideals with authority and to enlighten others, could be 
seen to have a pronounced relation to Winch’s work on ethical 
reasoning. Section 4 will detail some aspects of this relation. For now 
it is important to reiterate that Crary’s appeal to Winch as showing 
that “social concepts trace out patterns in a ground that is essentially 
structured by practical normativity or, in other words, in a ground 
that is essentially ethically non-neutral” (2018b: 30) does not lead to 
any methodological proposition that bolsters Critical Theory, 
because it does nothing to differentiate between the various values 
in that non-neutral ground or to recommend some of them. This 
means that although Crary wants to dub Crenshaw’s efforts at 
shifting our sensibilities and “what strikes us as important” as 
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rational, in the wide sense, this merely saves them from exclusion 
and does nothing to recommend them over anybody else’s efforts. 
Thus, “rationally authoritative” is actually equated with “admissible 
for consideration” so in that attenuated sense of “rationally 
authoritative” nothing stops us from calling, e.g., Donald Trump 
rationally authoritative, for his own non-neutral efforts at shifting 
our sensibilities are admissible for consideration.  
I will now turn to consider aspects of Crary’s earlier work that 
might be taken to offer, at least in part, a way out of this conundrum 
by distinguishing, not the favoured content of our sensibilities, but 
the particular kinds of non-neutral means that are effective in 
shaping them. 
 
3. The methodological employment of literary form 
My focus in this section will be on the methodological import for 
critical social thought of Crary’s attempt (2016) to widen a notion 
close to that of rationality, i.e. the notion of argument, in order to 
include the shaping of our sensibilities by what she contends are 
particularly powerful means, namely artistic and, more specifically, 
literary forms. Before discussing Crary’s conception, it should be 
noted that the notion of form is particularly tricky when used in a 
generalising way because it does not mark only one kind of 
distinction: there are wide and narrow conceptions depending on 
what they include and leave out. In philosophy, the notion of form 
as logical form has been used prescriptively with regard to practices 
of human reasoning which have been found ultimately underpinned 
by and, for that reason, inferior to particular ways of speaking tied 
to formal logical calculi (Stenlund 1996 and 1997). There is a danger 
of retaining this orientation, for example, when speaking of the form 
of moral reasoning – not only in the temptation to hold up some 
standard that is appealing to the philosophical imagination, but also 
in tying reasoning to particular linguistic or textual features, as part 
of the idea that there are some such general features which can help 
us identify, in a context-independent way, when we are dealing with 
a case of moral reasoning. In other words, the idea is that moral 
reasoning possesses an identifiable logical form, which, although not 
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sufficient to ensure soundness, is necessary in that any departures 
from it are doomed to be invalid.7  
Whilst it may be objected that this picture has exhausted its 
appeal, there is an only apparently more enlightened understanding 
of form that takes it that since it is hardly appropriate to go searching 
for the form of moral reasoning as something additional to different 
forms of writing, for example, novels, academic papers, speeches, 
editorials and letters to the editor, we ought, instead, to choose one 
of these forms as the vehicle of moral reasoning. Importantly, the 
notion of form here is not specified with reference to the full range 
of features of activities that these kinds of writing play a part in, but 
is understood as types of texts with particular characteristics that 
render those texts appropriate in expressing and addressing moral 
concerns. In the context of this picture, the widely acknowledged 
fact that one can find moral illumination in works of literature is 
attributed to the literary form in a narrow sense, one that does not 
include reference to the kinds of wider logical features, besides 
certain textual ones, that make literature, literature. Once such 
powers are conceived as attached to narrow literary form, then the 
latter can be employed in the service of purposes that are actually 
incompatible with artistic activities, or extracted and inserted into 
other kinds of activities with discrepant aims. As we will see, it is this 
conception that underlies Crary’s methodological recommendations 
on using literature in ethics and in the service of practical projects. 
Crary is not alone but one in a series of scholars to point to the 
relationship between literature and ethics. She is in fact in the good 
company of philosophers such as Iris Murdoch, Peter Winch, R.W. 
Beardsmore, Martha Nussbaum, Raimond Gaita 8  and Cora Dia-
                                                          
7 If one still wants to talk about the form of moral reasoning then one needs to do so in a 
broad sense that goes beyond lexical, grammatical, syntactical, textual or discursive features 
but identifies features which are dependent on content, context and biography. 
Accordingly, the question of moral force should not be understood as separate to and as 
hinging on a strict notion of form, but as another way of getting at the features that 
contribute to the sense of a piece of reasoning, and to its nature as compelling or otherwise. 
8 Gaita perceives writing about human life as closer to art than to science and notes that 
“reflection on the human condition must respect the inseparability of form from content if 
it is to avoid reductionism”, adding that “had philosophy been more attentive to the 
understanding of life offered by literature rather than by science or metaphysics (of a kind 
that also aspires to separate form from content), then we would be better able to cope with 
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mond.9 Crary’s particular aim is to explode restrictive philosophical 
conceptions of what learning about human life and reality can 
amount to, and at the very least to open up the possibility that 
“insofar as they shape our ethical conceptions of human and animal 
life, literary works can internally inform the sort of empirical grasp 
of human beings and animals that is relevant to ethics” (2016: 6). 
                                                          
the tensions generated by the acknowledgement that thought about life and morality is 
inescapably in medias res, and the aspiration to a universal ethic based on a sense of the 
commonness of human experience” (2002: 283-4). He connects the latter to the 
“universality we attribute to great literature” which allows for an instructive comparison 
with Boltanski’s take on critical social science: “The entanglement between description and 
critique requires a complex exteriority, which makes it possible to assess a particular state of 
affairs and thereby take a normative stance. Real sociology must always be critical. What would be 
the point of producing a merely descriptive theory? People expect from sociology that it 
facilitates critique and that, by doing so, it contributes to the betterment of society. The 
normative underpinning of this critique cannot consist of a locally anchored – cultural, 
religious, or moral – viewpoint (which is often the case in everyday criticism). For sociology 
makes a claim to being universal” (Boltanski et al. 2014: 572).  
9 Diamond raised the issue of the relation between literature and moral philosophy in her 
The Realistic Spirit (1991), where she is concerned to discredit the idea that the notion of 
rationality should be withheld from cases of imagination and creativity outside a fixed 
system (1991: 7) and, going beyond ideals of ethical rationality (8), affirms that ethical 
thought goes on in stories and images (1991: 9). She is also concerned with the distinction 
between what effects conversions and what holds up to appropriate standards (1991: 9). In 
”Anything but Argument” she reiterates (1991: 297) that a story resists being put in 
argument (premise and conclusion) form and notes that a convincing novel is not one that 
convinces everyone or gets them to change (1991: 306), adding some faults readers may 
have that prevent this from happening, for example having limited moral imagination or 
lack of a sense of irony (1991: 292). We are shown how (1991: 292-294) Dickens may have 
written novels with moral aims in view and how what is aimed at is not mere conversion – 
Dickens, for example, has tried to get us to see the world from the point of view of children 
(299). “Having a rough story about moral philosophy” introduces and responds to a 
number of articles, most notably one by Martha Nussbaum who herself has advocated the 
value of literature in moral philosophy and prompted the title of the piece: it indicates what 
is necessary before any discussion of literature and philosophy can take place. There are of 
course different views of the aims of moral philosophy: clarification, which is portrayed as 
moribund at the time, providing answers to questions such as what to do or what is the 
good life, and a different conception of the field which includes the role of the reader of 
moral philosophy (1991: 369). Seeing the moral significance of literature is “seeing gestures, 
manners, styles […] as morally expressive” (1991: 378). How is literature to be positioned 
with regard to philosophy? D.D. Raphael, one of the contributors to the issue Diamond is 
commenting on, conceives of it as evidence, which she sees as a restrictive conception of 
the story mattering as narrative sequence and as setting, but not as the form of its telling 
(1991: 378). Following Nussbaum the novel is seen as a moral discovery of a form of 
describing life. Presumably elaborating on a theme from Murdoch, not only action but 
thought and imagination too are to be seen as important (1991: 377). 
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Moreover, echoing Diamond, and in the spirit we have examined in 
the previous section, she protests against the equally restrictive 
character of what certain philosophers count as an argument. She 
contends that works of literature are serviceable in enriching our 
moral understanding via what she calls their literary qualities, that is, 
“those qualities that have a tendency to engage readers, shaping their 
senses of what is interesting and important. Thus understood, 
literary qualities include things like the use of irony, ambiguity, 
repetition, metaphor, and other types of figurative language, and […] 
the selection of particular temporal strategies, vocabularies, narrative 
voices, and even page layouts” (2016: 205). Against the idea that such 
qualities are merely ornamental she wishes to recommend, again 
echoing Diamond, the possibility that “the value of a literary work 
for moral philosophy might be a direct function of its literary 
features and that literature as literature might contribute directly to 
moral philosophy” (2016: 205), 10  and that “the rational moral 
interest of particular works of literature may extend, beyond any 
examples and plain arguments that can be extracted from them, to 
their tendency to engage us and shape our sensibilities” (2016: 206).  
Like in the case of rationality made wide so as to extend beyond 
metaphysical abstractions, one cannot but be sympathetic to Crary’s 
efforts to get certain strands of moral philosophy to loosen their 
unrealistic restrictions on what is considered to belong to moral 
argument and, thus, what is (relevant to) its subject matter. It is 
worth stressing that Crary meticulously documents how particular 
works, by authors such as Leo Tolstoy and John Maxwell Coetzee, 
engage us. Analogously to her rendering admissible Crenshaw’s 
efforts at shaping our sensibilities, her aim here too is to establish 
the very admissibility of the sensibility-shaping features of works of 
literature as part of a wider notion of (moral) argument. This means 
that she is not concerned to address when, and to what extent this 
                                                          
10 Similarly, Beardsmore (1971: 65) laments: “There is no conception that what an artist can 
contribute to morality may lie in precisely what makes him a creative artist. On this account, 
the only function of his creativeness is to enable him to dress up sets of antecedently 
established moral principles in situations which will bring home their force to his readers. 
If, however, this account is to be rejected, then it is necessary to show that the general 
account which provides its rationale, the theory that all learning is the learning of 
principles.” 
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shaping may occur or how it might be frustrated. Moreover, there is 
a temptation present here, to which I believe Crary gives in, which is 
to go after something markedly stronger than advocating mere 
admissibility for consideration (by near-sighted moral philosophers), 
and to put forth a thesis as to the appropriateness11 of literary forms 
of writing and their repurposing in the design of practical projects. 
In effect, then, Crary is offering not only an observation about how 
literary qualities may shape our sensibilities but issuing a 
methodological recommendation about using their power in the 
social sciences as part of a set of “non-neutral methods” placed in 
the service of practical aims. If the accomplishment of practical aims 
requires our sensibilities to shift, then such methods are 
indispensable, she seems to argue. 
This idea is exhibited quite clearly, besides what we have seen 
already, in a recent piece against the methodologically chosen ethical 
neutrality of “analytic feminism” where Crary proposes in exchange 
a “methodological radicalism that involves making use of the prac-
tical power of ethically non-neutral resources, conceived as in them-
selves cognitively authoritative” (2018b: 47).12 Another instance of 
this idea can be found in her discussion of non-fictional works 
against animal testing or using animals as food where she cites 
Jonathan Safran Foer’s Eating Animals precisely in respect of his use 
of “passages that are designed to shape readers’ attitudes toward 
animals” (Crary 2016: 259) in order to attack factory farming. One 
                                                          
11 The question of appropriateness can, of course, be inflected in a number of ways, some 
of which are stronger than others, and tied in various degrees to the justification of such 
reasoning. For example, a certain form can be seen as a necessary condition for even having 
a moral discussion or, further, as implying that the reasoning offered is actually compelling 
or, yet further, that it must be seen as compelling by all exposed to it on pain of irrationality, 
or, finally, that it must thus effect whatever behavioural changes are warranted by the 
reasoning. It seems that being appropriate, compelling and effective are not collapsible even 
if they sometimes do go together. 
12 Consider also Crary’s recent discussion of her book in an interview where she explains 
that “the things I do in ethics directly guide social criticism” and she continues: “Recently 
I’ve been working with colleagues in the US and in Europe on traditions of social critique, 
and in doing so I am making use of the ground covered in Inside Ethics […] I am committed 
to radical, practice-oriented social criticism – social criticism that explores systematic forms 
of social subordination having to do with, say, race, gender, ability, class, body shape and 
age – and I see my work as bringing more clearly into view the realm of values to which 
such criticism is responsible.” http://socialresearchmatters.org/2071-2/ (accessed 
22/5/2018). 
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such passage, for example, features shock tactics in the form of the 
juxtaposition of the author’s account of his life with and love for his 
dog, and a Philippine recipe for making dog stew.  
Crary’s methodological recommendations are to be understood 
as bearing significant import for those parts of philosophy and the 
social sciences, including critical social thought, which have 
embraced practical aims in exposing structures of domination, in 
enlightening and, ultimately, emancipating people. The 
recommendations depend not only on ideas regarding how art can 
contribute to moral education or debate, or expand the moral 
imagination (which it undeniably can do on occasion, though, as we 
will see, not necessarily take aim at), but also on the idea that using 
artistic forms can help disciplines likes philosophy or the social sciences achieve 
practical aims.13 I will now attempt to subject these ideas to exam-
ination. In the following three sub-sections I would like to reflect on 
the way in which literary forms of writing manage to achieve moral 
enlightenment (3.1), the practical use of such forms or their 
embedding within other kinds of activities, in this case, academic 
inquiry (3.2) and, finally, the compatibility of practical aims with 
academically organised inquiry (3.3).  
3.1 Art and Moral Enlightenment 
I have already alluded to the fact that Crary’s use of the notion of 
literary form or literary qualities as sensibility-shaping takes attention 
away from the logical features of artistic activity, and thus ends up 
misconstruing the role that those forms play in terms of being part 
of the activities they are part of, by extension misconstruing the very 
character of those activities. Any sufficiently broad account of 
writing novels ought to include the range of criteria and aims that 
enter into what a novel is trying to accomplish. This gives the means 
employed their point and allows that they be appropriately 
understood and evaluated as to their judicious use.  
                                                          
13 As far as the social sciences are concerned this aspiration needs to be understood as a 
way of stepping back from positivist requirements in the wake of positivism’s demise, and 
towards thinking of the social sciences as closer to art than to science (Lepenies 1988; 
Sennett 2009). 
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Conceiving of moral enlightenment as a function of literary 
qualities discards this decisive context, which is itself decisively 
incompatible with predicating moral enlightenment as an aim of 
artistic activity. The problem is not that moral enlightenment is 
nebulous and thus fails as an aim because anything not capable of 
being controlled or guaranteed must do so. Revolution is in a sense 
incapable of being subject to controls and guarantees, but that does 
not stop political programmes from being organised with that 
explicit aim. Rather, the very idea that the aim of literature is moral 
enlightenment invokes an incoherent conception of the activity. 
Beardsmore puts his finger on the problem in rejecting the means-
ends form when applied to the use of literature in order to effect a 
moral purpose by pointing out that the “moralist [who] holds that a 
work of art, a novel or a painting, is an instrument for transmitting 
some set of moral beliefs […] introduces a radical confusion about 
the way in which a work of art tells us something, that is, about what 
‘saying’ or ‘telling’ means here, a confusion which blurs precisely the 
distinction [between purposive and artistic activities]” (1971: 15) 
(original emphasis) even at the limiting case where one wishes to 
retain this way of speaking and say that art is done “for the sake of 
art” (1971: 20).  
Now, Diamond (1991: 292–299) seems to be making a 
contrasting point in stating that Charles Dickens had written novels 
with moral aims in view, when she lists one such aim as getting us to 
see the world from the point of view of children. Without wishing 
to deny the appropriateness of such a description, it can be debated 
to what extent it identifies a moral accomplishment separable from 
the artistic accomplishment.14  Moreover, the  cultivation  of  such 
moral sensibilities is one among a number of features important for 
understanding and appraising the novel. Nor will an author’s self-
avowal render this moral demand overriding, for even if Dickens 
proclaimed that this was the sole aim of his work, the fact that it took 
the form of novels still guarantees that it is seen in the light of a range 
                                                          
14  Indeed, consider how natural the description “seeing through the eyes of” is for 
storytelling, not only in the case of literature, but also in film where it can find expression 
in a “point of view” shot. 
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of other criteria, a point which applies both to contexts of 
production and reception.  
Even more significantly, it seems that the achievement of artistic 
goals is a condition for any further virtues to develop, a fact which 
introduces a potential tension with any explicitly avowed moral 
aims.15 For example, a theatrical performance I recently attended had 
chosen to present fragments from the lives of refugees in the context 
of the recent influx towards Europe from Syria and other regions in 
Africa and the Middle East. The issue is one of grave importance 
indeed, involving war, pain and suffering, power struggles, 
international jostling for influence in the area, forms of evasion of 
responsibility, nationalist reflexes and various kinds of potentially 
indecent profiting. As such, then, it could be thought of as a highly 
suitable moral target for the performance. Yet, this aim cannot 
override artistic demands and, on the contrary, can end up placing 
not weaker but rather stronger requirements on the artistic 
execution. If elements of directing, plot, acting, etc. are found 
artistically wanting they are not excused by the gravity of the issue, 
but rather shown in an even harsher light as failing to do justice to 
it. Moreover, aiming at such a morally charged and complex issue 
can detract from the performance, which can be criticized for 
banking too much on the topical nature of the issue, and thus being 
lazy or being superficial by taking for granted a certain version of the 
issue, or being blatantly didactic or resorting to preaching, etc. Cases 
such as the above invoke precisely the wider set of aims and features 
of artistic activity, which when found lacking render a work 
vulnerable to the various charges nicely encapsulated in the following 
remark by Michael Oakeshott. He perhaps slightly exaggerates the 
point, yet in completely breaking the connection between practical 
life and art, manages to provide a salutary warning against the 
introduction of criteria which disregard artistic demands and 
                                                          
15 Stanley Fish makes an analogous point (2012: 102) when he recounts the complaints Mike 
Nichols encountered by some viewers after having the character played by Dustin Hoffman 
in The Graduate drive across the Bay Bridge on the wrong side of the road (when compared 
to actual traffic) and points out that they were misplaced given the artistic demands of 
lighting, camera angle, etc. that warranted that decision. Placing the character on the correct 
side would not have served the artistic goals of the film any better, in fact the opposite 
would have been the case.  
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misunderstand the particular ways of “saying” and “telling” available 
to art (ways which when compared to politics could be described as 
indirect, derivative, or serendipitous as opposed to programmed or 
designed for). In his 1959 essay “The voice of poetry in the 
conversation of mankind” Oakeshott exclaims: “poetry has nothing 
to teach us about how to live or what we ought to approve […] if it 
imitates the voice of practice its utterance is counterfeit” (1991: 540). 
While it is patent that literary writing can on occasion exhibit 
considerable moral force, it does so by sticking to artistic demands, 
and not taking aim at anything that can compromise such demands.  
3.2 The Non-formal, Non-transportable Character of Moral 
Features 
The above reflections ought to have complicated the sense in which 
art can take aim at moral enlightenment. It would be a mistake to 
single out literary qualities as bearers of what literature is about and 
thus bearers of whatever moral functions literature can serve; rather, 
it is the position that these qualities hold within artistic activities 
which renders them logically appropriate to literary and moral 
effects. Thus, whatever the moral force of literature, if, as both 
Diamond and Crary contend, it is tied to literature as literature, it 
requires and does not work in spite of artistic criteria, and for that 
reason is not a transportable feature. This is half-recognised by Crary 
herself who does not propose to substitute her discussion of novels 
for the novels themselves, thus preserving their distinctiveness, and 
who is also sensitive to differences between genres.16 What is per-
haps not recognised is that this carries an implication against 
“methodological radicalism”, since incorporating literary qualities in 
academic writing17 does not get us any closer to literature. Further-
more, any proposal to model philosophy or sociology as activities on 
literature would entail a significant amount of changes in order to 
ensure alignment in the use of these forms, changes that would 
                                                          
16 Beardsmore’s following observation is instructive with regard to different literary genres: 
“If there is a difference in the way in which Dostoevsky and Elkin express themselves, it is 
not a difference in the words or tone which they employ, but a difference in the importance 
of these features for an understanding of their writings” (1971: 16). 
17 An idea closely associated with certain forms of social scientific aspiration, and not to be 
equated with moral philosophy’s examination of or drawing upon works of literature. 
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drastically alter the character of such activities (I will come back to 
this in 3.3).  
Most importantly, one should not forget that there are artistic as 
well as moral demands placed on the use of literary devices in other, 
even avowedly practical contexts. Crary commends, for example, the 
kind of evocative language (Crary 2016: 263) that Foer uses in 
describing what happens to chickens on their way to the 
slaughterhouse. However, it is important to remember that besides 
being profoundly moved by the depiction of suffering inflicted on 
the animals, an alternative reaction might be to shake our heads and 
protest at the sentimentality of the description on the grounds that 
the devices are used in a clumsy, disproportionate or too blatant a 
way. The unwarranted use of techniques of evocative or shocking 
language may even be seen as a moral failing in that we may object 
that the author is being disingenuous, in effect, not using these ways 
of speaking judiciously but rather abusing them in order to 
manipulate the reader.  
This example ought to make clear that any moral power attaching 
to the use of non-neutral literary devices is subject to a number of 
non-formal conditions, not in the least the sincerity and genuineness 
of the voice telling the story. One cannot claim to harness that power 
and employ it at will, unless one is also able to control for the 
conditions that need to be in place; since it is far from clear whether 
philosophy or the social sciences can do this, it does not make sense 
to propose that they make methodical use of literary devices. 
3.3 Academic Disciplines and Practical Aims 
The argument so far has progressed by questioning the sense in 
which literature can be said to aim at practical ends and, further, 
whether its morally compelling character can be systematically 
predicated on literary qualities and thus employed in the context of 
other activities. I would now like to come back to the central 
underlying idea in Crary’s methodological vision for critical social 
thought, namely, that philosophy or the social sciences18 can take 
                                                          
18 When the grammatical subject is philosophy or social science the question is precisely 
about the disciplinary contribution and appropriateness of what the discipline affords. An 
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aim at practical ends, for instance, moral enlightenment and 
emancipation. 
In the first part of this article I noted the problems in the 
connection of disciplinary activities with such aims. I focused on the 
latter’s compatibility with academic staples such as concepts of 
knowledge and expertise, and suggested that the strained application 
of these concepts in the case of moral enlightenment or 
emancipation weakens that link. Further to those remarks I would 
like to observe, somewhat symmetrically to what is the case for 
artistic activity, that there is considerable difference between doing 
something by design, and, on the other hand, being amenable to a 
certain effect. The proposition being debated is, of course, the 
former. It may effortlessly suggest itself when one encounters the 
commitment and passion exhibited by those who have found moral 
enlightenment in critical social thought. Yet, it does not follow from 
the observation that oneself or others have found such 
enlightenment through the pursuit of philosophy or sociology that 
such disciplines can legitimately take aim at moral enlightenment. 
It is indeed true that philosophy or sociology can transform one’s 
life, but that does not mean that they can be designed to achieve this. 
For one, consider the kinds of personal commitments, work and 
devotion that are required in order for someone to say that 
philosophy or sociology changed their life or changed their thinking. 
Think, moreover, of how strongly that declaration can actually be 
taken before it becomes unsuitable as a condition for participation 
in those subjects; think, for example, of the degree to which one can 
follow Wittgenstein’s way of philosophising and the extreme 
                                                          
instructive example of a “what philosophy cannot do” argument can be found in Lars 
Hertzberg’s recent article (2017) where he argues (expositing and following Winch) against 
the idea that philosophy can give a verdict on whether words make sense or whether an 
action is rational. The question he does not raise explicitly, however, is what he understands 
by ‘philosophy’, specifically what he takes the operative contrast to be. Hertzberg’s 
argument pits the local and the personal together against the a priori, so the contrast is not 
with some other subject of academic learning which can do in some other way what 
philosophy with its penchant for generalisation and apriorism cannot do. His point must 
be not to conceive such a task as a matter capable of being discharged in this way, namely 
in the form of disciplinarily organised enquiry. While philosophers cannot pass judgement 
in the way they think they can, lay persons in general, we, can pass occasioned judgements, 
we can make determinations and evaluations in particular contexts as to sense and 
rationality. Nothing stronger can be claimed by professionals. 
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personal cost this might entail, taking one precisely outside 
disciplinarily established ways of doing things. But this cannot be 
demanded of practitioners, nor of any audience a discipline might 
reach towards. 
Unfortunately, I cannot pursue the matter at the required length 
here. However, I should like to note that it turns, firstly, on a sober 
appreciation of philosophy and the social sciences, moderately 
within the bounds of their past record and achievements, as well as 
training regimes, research practices and overall institutional 
organisation. Secondly, it turns on a sound appreciation of our moral 
practices, for therein cases of emancipation and moral enlightenment 
are exhibited, authoritative actions undertaken and morally 
compelling reasons offered. I will now turn to address this second 
aspect while also attempting to pull together the various strands of 
argument I have presented throughout this article.  
 
4. Winch on Knowing One’s Neighbour and the Parable 
Form  
I have contended that Crary’s use of Winch is somewhat selective 
and that, far from being strongly compatible with critical social 
thought, Winch’s work in fact problematises its central aspirations. 
His sensitivity, in particular, to crucial logical features of our moral 
practices can be used to deepen our understanding of what is wrong 
with critical social thought, pointing to the problems with Crary’s 
defence of its authoritativeness and also deflecting Crary’s 
methodological recommendations around literary form. In what 
follows I will focus on Winch’s remarkable discussion of the parable 
of the Good Samaritan in the Gospel According to Luke in “Who is 
my neighbour?” (1987a) and, by way of some supplementary 
remarks, in “Particularity and Morals” (1987b). 
I consider the relevant passage (Luke 10, 25–37) well-known, so 
I will only provide a brief description. A lawyer appears who, in order 
“to tempt” Jesus, asks him how he can inherit eternal life. Jesus refers 
him to the Law (The Old Testament) and the reply given by the 
lawyer as to how he reads the Law (including “love your neighbour 
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as thyself”) is acknowledged as correct by Jesus. But the lawyer then 
asks “who is my neighbour?” in an attempt to come back at Jesus, 
and to justify or defend himself for having asked a question which 
had not been seen as identifying a problem. The lawyer’s riposte can 
be taken as an attempt to draw on his professional capacity, perhaps 
already invoked by the fact that Jesus had asked him about the Law, 
professing not to understand because of a technical issue of 
interpretation. Jesus meets this with the telling of the parable. It is 
interesting to note that while Winch seems to treat the lawyer’s 
question as genuine, Phillips (1992: 248) comments that the lawyer 
is perhaps not asking in earnest and needs to be shaken out of his 
game-playing, something which, he contends, is accomplished by the 
parable.  
Regardless of how we might interpret the lawyer’s intentions, 
there is a temptation here, namely to focus on narrow features of the 
parable form and to predicate particular powers of those features, 
much like the sensibility-shaping powers that Crary attributes to 
“literary qualities”. The temptation should be resisted, however, by, 
firstly, being sensitive to the setting in which the parable is offered, 
namely the lawyer’s initial questions that lead to Jesus telling the 
story19 and, following from this, by focusing with Winch on the 
kinds of features that not only bypass the potential fascination with 
form but also bring out what is crucial to the moral point of the 
story. 
First of all, Winch notes that the response given through the 
parable of the Good Samaritan is not one providing some kind of 
definitional account of being a neighbour, for example, listing 
characteristics of a specific type of neighbour or neighbours in 
                                                          
19 Despite the general prevalence of parables in the gospels, if we follow Phillips’s reasoning 
we can tie the parable of the Good Samaritan to its local function. This renders Jesus’s 
teaching highly specific in the sense that were he confronting someone else who had a 
different type of concern (perhaps a more genuine one) he might not have responded in 
this way. Moreover, we might even broaden the scope yet further in order to include prior 
passages portraying the return of the seventy-two disciples Jesus has sent out to cities 
(“rejoice, because your names are written in heaven”), his praising of the Father for 
withholding from the wise and revealing to the simple minded, and explaining to his 
disciples that they should consider themselves lucky to be able to see and witness what 
others cannot. This can provide a wider context for the episode of the lawyer who, in effect, 
raises doubts as to what can be witnessed. 
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general; the indexical ‘my’ establishes that the question concerns a 
personal relationship between particular individuals and this sets the 
stage for the kind of response that is appropriate. The importance of 
this relationship is also reflected in the fact that, according to Winch, 
if one were given a general impersonal answer, one would not be 
able to understand it, so the lawyer is asked to provide the right 
answer himself. By confirming that it was the Samaritan who was 
neighbour to the injured man, the lawyer demonstrates his 
understanding, which is at the same time a recognition of the 
Samaritan’s reaction as “an expression of his [the lawyer’s] own 
moral sensibilities” (Raffnsøe-Møller 1997: 346).  
By acknowledging that they constitute, perhaps an unattainably 
selfless, yet still clear expression of his own inclinations, the lawyer 
confirms that he sees the Samaritan’s actions as authoritative. 
Precisely because it does not make sense to insist on the 
authoritativeness of the Samaritan’s actions independently of this 
acknowledgement, and in the face of the fact that there are no 
guarantees that this acknowledgement will take place, we might, once 
again, be tempted to resort to ideas regarding the power of the 
parable form, whose function might be taken to facilitate such an 
acknowledgement. There is nothing wrong with this way of phrasing 
matters, provided that we keep in mind that “[t]he force of the 
parable comes from the sight I am asked to contemplate in 
imagination of this wounded man lying here in my path” (Winch 
1987b: 174, my emphasis).20 Winch’s remark bypasses any reference 
to literary form, being instead responsive to a non-formal notion of 
moral reasoning. The crucial feature is not the means through which 
one achieves this, but the very fact that I am engaged as a person, 
speaking for myself, seeing my own reactions and sensibilities in the 
light of a range of responses to another person’s need, among which 
some were callous and self-serving while others were remarkably 
pure. In short, Winch invokes the personal dimension as crucial to 
moral understanding. 
                                                          
20 While we may distinguish between the way the parable works on the lawyer, and the way 
the entire episode is meant to work on the faithful, Winch’s point can be taken to cover 
both cases. 
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At this point, it is important to emphasise that the sense in which 
we speak of “understanding” or “knowledge” in this connection is 
incompatible with the aspirations of critical social thought. 
“Understanding” (or “knowledge”) here is not something 
propositional and does not look like a suitable candidate in order to 
constitute a collective cognitive basis; it is not something which can 
be possessed as a fait accompli as part of a disciplinary corpus, or taken 
for granted by virtue of training in Critical Theory, or licensed by 
virtue of membership in a professional association. Rather, it retains 
an open-ended character attuned to the particularities of persons and 
contexts being most strongly tied to personal action which, by being 
itself tied to, one might say, the concept of a life, always remains in 
principle revisable in light of the future. At the end of the passage 
the lawyer is exhorted to “go and do thou likewise”, but this is hardly 
to be interpreted in a way that would render reference to the 
particular person of the lawyer redundant, e.g., “help anyone you 
find injured without exception” or “act like the Samaritan in every 
conceivable situation”. Rather, what will count as doing likewise is 
left open, it is something for the lawyer to decide and to justify, if 
called upon to do so, in each next case with reference to an open-
ended set of possible concerns. 
With reference to the question of justification in particular, what 
is striking in Winch’s account is his insistence that the description of 
the Samaritan’s response to the injured man, although offered as an 
exemplification of divine law, makes no reference to any kind of 
justification or reason for his actions, and that this is something 
entirely appropriate; that it is not some kind of defect, or indication 
of an elliptical formulation. There is no justification missing: “That 
reaction is simply described and contrasted with the behaviour of the 
priest and the Levite; and we are admonished to go and do likewise” 
(1987b: 174). That is all! In fact, Winch goes on to say that not only 
is the Samaritan’s response not justified by appeal to what the divine 
law commands, but that it works in spite of the law: 
[H]is parable did not appeal to the conception (of God as law-giver): it 
challenged it. Or at least it commented on the conception in a way which 
presupposed that the moral modality to which the Samaritan responded 
would have a force for the parable’s hearers independently of their 
commitment to any particular theological belief. It is the lawyer’s own 
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response to that modality which enables him to answer Jesus’s final 
question and thus to expand his comprehension of the law. (Winch 
1987b: 160) 
Once again, Winch’s remarks cast light on what expressions such 
as ‘understanding’ or ‘justification’, (and to tie the discussion to those 
coveted terms Crary is after) ‘rationality’ or ‘authoritativeness’ can 
amount to in some cases of moral reasoning. Against the background 
of the priest and the Levite who both kept on walking, the 
Samaritan’s response to the injured man is seen as an exemplary case 
of pure kindness, care and love towards someone who, on account 
of ethnic or religious differences, the Samaritan might have had all 
sorts of self-serving excuses not to attend to. The fact that he did 
not allow such considerations to stifle his perception of the injured 
man’s need is what is remarkable about his response, together with 
the purity afforded by the complete lack of reasons or justifications 
for acting in this way. To proceed to treat the case as ungrounded 
unless, for instance, connected to Critical Theory’s conception of the 
social realisation of reason, and thus to offer justification for the way 
in which the Samaritan acted is not to bolster but to impoverish what he 
did. It is also to get the order wrong of what is primary here, for it is 
this manner of acting that shows the value and, if you will, rationality 
of love; it does not borrow these qualities from a principle of love or 
from divine law. Winch’s account insists on the primitive character 
of such exemplars by excluding any appeal to reasons for so acting, 
and thus puts into perspective what really makes the Samaritan’s 
response authoritative.  
Relating this to the cases Crary alludes to, and without wishing to 
obscure the complexity of the matter, it is worth wondering where 
the sources of moral authoritativeness are to be found. In cases such 
as that of Anita Hill or the women victimized by Daniel Holtzclaw, 
I would contend that the suffering, courage and overcoming present 
are primitive, and not in need of being metaphysically grounded or 
channelled through Critical Theory in order to be pronounced 
authoritative, rational or objective. In fact, the value to be found 
therein would be in danger of being lost by being made secondary to 
these kinds of justifications. Moreover, in appreciating and 
communicating this value to others there might be a place for literary 
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expression as there undoubtedly is for testimony, hearing about 
victims’ experiences in their own words, and personal involvement, 
getting to know them or seeing them in the light of another person’s 
love. The fact that these means can on occasion prove particularly 
powerful, however, does not mean that they can be separated from 
the lives and actions of those involved and usurped by critical social 
thought. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
In this article I have examined Alice Crary’s recent defence of critical 
social thought, comprising an attempt to ground it metaphysically 
via wide notions of objectivity, rationality and argument, and leading 
to a set of methodological recommendations centred on the power 
of literary form to effect moral enlightenment. To maintain a sound 
perspective on her work, it is important to bear in mind that a large 
part of her aims has to do with rendering critical social thought 
palatable to analytic philosophers who have tended not to allow it by 
relying on a range of inflexible conceptions. Yet, I have expressed 
reservations regarding both whether Crary herself manages to escape 
from some of these inflexible conceptions, and whether the 
imagined rapprochement of the Wittgensteinian and left-Hegelian 
traditions she attempts is well-conceived, having tried to show that 
it depends on subjecting the former tradition to a measure of 
selection and distortion. Equally, as regards the latter tradition and, 
more generally, projects of critical social thought, by focusing on 
metaphysics, Crary misconstrues the range of problems they face as 
well as their relation to our moral practices. 
Crary’s methodological proposals on the power of literary 
qualities were found to stumble on the fact that literature does not 
aim at moral enlightenment but achieves it indirectly, by being 
literature. As such, whatever contribution to moral understanding 
literary qualities can make is a non-formal, non-transportable matter. 
Critical social thought is in no better position to aim at moral 
understanding for, as Winch’s discussion of the parable of the Good 
Samaritan showed, the latter is unsuitable to receive the form of a 
disciplinary corpus and cannot be guaranteed by such means. While 
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the morally charged issues critical social thought focuses on 
undeniably deserve our attention, this does not imply that 
philosophy or the social sciences can make a business out of 
practically addressing them. 
By way of conclusion, I want to reiterate that the ontological 
fascination Crary demonstrates assumes a misleading methodo-
logical form in the idea that if the world is constitutively ethical, non-
neutral, then we need non-neutral, ethical, means to do justice to that 
world.21 Once contextualised within research practice, however, this 
proves to be a truly idle remark. Crary’s endorsement of not being 
uncommitted cannot be used in order to recommend being 
committed in one way or another, or to distinguish between a 
morally revealing case and a debased attempt at propaganda. 
Moreover, recommending non-neutral methods does nothing to 
show why these methods, e.g. literary forms, work in the way 
imagined or can in fact be methodologically repurposed in order to 
form part of critical social thought. Nor, finally, does it demonstrate 
the consistency between a disciplinary activity and the aims it sets 
itself, or the soundness of the relation it claims to have to our moral 
practices. 
Rejection of the methodological ideal of neutrality of the inquirer 
on ontological grounds is, finally, incoherent because that ideal is 
actually compatible with recognising that the social world is a word 
of value. Max Weber’s classic position on value-neutrality (1949a; 
1949b) entails not shying away from the consideration of problems 
as dictated by the relevance of values (Wertbeziehung) but being free 
from values (Wertfreiheit) in the sense of abstaining from endorsing 
or expounding ultimate value judgements by pretending that they are 
capable of scientific justification. His position, which in that respect 
is compatible with Winch’s, thus favours separation between 
speaking as an academic and speaking as a person. The real question 
for critical social thought is why it thinks it can do away with that 
distinction. 
                                                          
21 Yet another formulation of this idea can be found in the following passage: “social 
phenomena are irreducibly ethical and that they therefore reveal themselves to non-neutral 
modes of thought that only a wider conception of rationality equips us to recognize as 
rational” (Crary 2018b: 36). 
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